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ESSAY
PRINTZ, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE, AND THE
FIRE IN THE TRASH CAN: HAS JUSTICE
SCALIA PICKED THE COURT'S POCKET?
Jay S. Bybee*
In the film Mission Impossible, Ethan Hunt (played by Tom Cruise)
is a CIA operative who is wrongfully accused of murderously betraying
his colleagues. To clear his name and expose the actual traitor, Hunt
must obtain access to computer files that are stored under the most
secure conditions at headquarters in Langley. Hunt's first task is to
get into CIA headquarters in the middle of the day. Hunt and his
associates, masquerading as firefighters responding to a call, walk
through the front doors and past security. Once inside, they drug an
employee, break into a secured area through a most improbable
scheme, and steal the files. Hunt and his associates walk out the front
door undetected and drive off in a borrowed fire truck.
It is one of the oldest tricks in the book. The protagonist creates
a disturbance that focuses everyone else's attention. While they oc-
cupy themselves with the immediate distraction, the protagonist takes
care of the real business at hand. The story has a thousand variations,
but it is one repeated in life and celebrated in print and on celluloid:
the thief sets a fire in the trash can. While everyone scrambles to ex-
tinguish it, the thief does his duty. He picks pockets; he steals the
house blind; he does whatever he can get away with.
The fire in the trash can is a venerable trick, but the nature of
tricks that become "venerable" is that they work. Printz v. United
States' is an excellent example of the genre within the Supreme Court.
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las
Vegas. I wish to thank Christopher Bryant and Carl Tobias, who read earlier drafts
and offered helpful comments. I also acknowledge support from the James E. Rogers
Research Grant Foundation at the William S. Boyd School of Law.
1 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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In Printz, the Court held that certain sections of the Brady Handgun
Violence Prevention Act 2 were unconstitutional. 3 Until the Attorney
General set up a national system, the Act required the chief local law
enforcement official to make certain background checks. The Court
held that Congress exceeded its authority by requiring local law en-
forcement officials to take this action. Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia "conclude [d] categorically ... 'The Federal Government may
not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory pro-
gram."' ' 4 The Court offered two justifications. First, these commands
to the states are "fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional
system of dual sovereignty."5 Second, the Brady Act violated the sepa-
ration of powers because it assigned the enforcement of federal law to
state officials, thereby "reducing the power of the Presidency."6
Although the first justification commanded the immediate atten-
tion of a majority of the Court,7 four justices in dissent,8 lower courts,9
the national press, 10 and the academy,11 almost no one noticed Justice
Scalia's ever-so-brief aside on separation of powers. 12 Some observers
2 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)
(1994)).
3 Printz, 521 U.S. at 933-34 (holding unconstitutional 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (2) and
§ 922(s) (1) (A) (i) (III)-(IV)).
4 Id. at 933 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).
5 Id. at 935.
6 Id. at 923-24.
7 See id. at 935 (Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the
Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas joined).
8 See id. at 969-70 (Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined).
9 See, e.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Dep't of Public Safety v. United States, 994 F.
Supp. 1358, 1363 (W.D. Okla. 1997), rev'd, 161 F.3d 1266, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000); Condon v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 977, 982-83 (D.S.C.
1997), affd, 155 F.3d 453, 459-60 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
10 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Court Voids Background Check of Gusn Buyer Under Brady
Law, WASLi. PosT, June 28, 1997, at AI; Steven G. Calabresi, A Constitutional Revolution,
WALL ST. J., July 10, 1997, at A14; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Limit Brady Gun Law as
Intrusion on States' Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 1997, at Al.
11 For articles on Print; see Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Eti-
quette of Federalism: New York, Printz and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. CT. REv. 71; Vicki C. Jack-
son, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111 -IARv. L. REV.
2180 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Printz and Testa: The Infrastructure of Federal Supremacy,
32 IND. L. REv. 111 (1998); Ellen D. Katz, State Judges, State Officers, and Federal Com-
mands After Seminole Tribe and Printz, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 1465.
12 Two exceptions are Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the Limits of
Formalism, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 199; Neil Kinkopf, Of Devolution, Privatization and Global-
ization: Separation of Powers Limits on Congressional Authority To Assign Federal Power to
Non-Federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 331, 375-83 (1998).
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may have ignored the point because they thought it was dicta. Per-
haps others failed to notice because Justice Scalia's separation of pow-
ers analysis sounded so familiar and, thus, appeared unexceptional.
The analysis should have been familiar.13 Justice Scalia's separation of
powers principle has been expounded before-namely, by Justice
Scalia in his dissent in Morrison v. Olson.14
In fact, Justice Scalia took his brief separation of powers argu-
ment in Printz-analyically and rhetorically-straight out of his Moni-
son dissent. Justice Scalia has argued for a theory of the unitary
executive that the remainder of the Court has never supported. Re-
markably, Justice Scalia offered his argument without any hint of its
provenance or its potential. Taken to its logical conclusion, Justice
Scalia's separation of powers principle in Printz would not only resus-
citate his dissent in Morrison, it would threaten Humphrey's Executor v.
United States15 and the independence of the fourth branch of govern-
ment, the independent regulatory agencies. Although six Justices
wrote opinions in Printz and they had more than their share bf give-
and-take, somewhere in the process no one was watching Justice
Scalia. And despite vigorous dissents by Justices Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer, Justice Scalia picked the Court's pocket clean on separation of
powers.
13 This suggests that I have used the wrong crime metaphor. Rather than divert-
ing the Court with the fire in the trash can (federalism) to pull off ajudicial sleight-of-
hand (separation of powers), maybe Scalia's point appeared so obvious, so routine,
that no one thought to suspect it. Maybe the better analogy is G.K. Chesterton's im-
age in The Invisible Man in which a murderer entered the building at mid-day, com-
mitted the crime, and left with the body by the front door and past the guard, all
without being seen. Father Brown discovers that the murderer walked undetected
through the neighborhood as the mail carrier. No bne thought to suspect a person so
common and routine. G.K. CHESTERTON, The Invisible Man, in THE FATHER BROWN
OMNIBUS 82, 99 (rev. ed. 1951). Although it is hard to think of anyone surrendering a
role played by Tom Cruise, given Justice Scalia's Catholic background, see George
Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297, 1309-20
(1990), perhaps he would not mind matching wits with Father Brown. If Father
Brown represents the better metaphor, my alternative title for this piece is "Printz,
Morrison and Separation of Powers: The Postman Rings Twice."
14 See 487 U.S. 654, 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (1998); see also Caminker,
supra note 12, at 226 (suggesting that this section was "an attempted end-run around
the Court's rejection of [Scalia's] . .. position in Morrison'); Ralph A. Rossum, The
Irony of Constitutional Democracy: Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amend-
ment, 36 SAN Dmoo L. REV. 671, 737-38 (1999) (noting that Scalia's argument in
Printz "comes, of course, directly from his dissent in Morrison v. Olson").
15 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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I. FEDERALISM V. SEPARATION OF POWERS IN PRINTZ
The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act1 6 amended the
Gun Control Act of 196817 to require that the Attorney General create
a new national background check for persons who purchase hand-
guns from dealers. However, practical reasons prevented the Attorney
General from implementing the Brady Act immediately, so the legisla-
tion prescribed an interim measure. In states that did not have a per-
mitting scheme or background check in place, the Brady Act required
the local "chief law enforcement official" (CLEO) to "make a reasona-
ble effort to ascertain within 5 business days whether receipt or posses-
sion would be in violation of the law," including performing
"research" in state, local, and national record systems.18 CLEOs in
Montana and Arizona filed separate suits arguing that the Brady Act's
modest directive to participate in the interim background check pro-
gram violated the Constitution because the federal government had
"commandeered" state officials.1 9 The Court rejected the federal gov-
ernment's argument that the "commandeering" principles did not ap-
ply when the Congress required state officials to enforce federal law,
except when it directed legislative action. 20
Justice Scalia began his opinion for the Court by acknowledging
that the text of the Constitution did not address the question
presented in this case.21 Therefore, the Court would have to resolve
the case by relying on historical practice, the structure of the Constitu-
tion, and the Court's jurisprudence, "in that order."22 In Section II of
16 16 Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)
(1994)).
17 Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 921-928 (1994)).
18 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (2) (1994). The Brady Act also requires the CLEO, under
specified circumstances, to provide gun dealers with written statement of reasons for a
purchaser's ineligibility. See id. § 922(s) (6) (C). Under other circumstances, the
CLEO was required to destroy the records in his possession. See id. § 922(s) (6) (B) (i).
The Court in Printz held that these latter provisions did not command action on the
part of the CLEO unless "he has chosen, voluntarily, to participate in administration
of the federal scheme." Printz, 521 U.S. at 934.
19 Printz, 521 U.S. at 903-04; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161
(1992); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
20 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
21 See id. at 905.
22 Printz, 521 U.S. at 905. I find it rather surprising that, having admitted the
silence of the text, Justice Scalia turned to "historical understanding and practice"
rather than the structure of the Constitution, which he considered in Section III of
the opinion. Id. at 918-35. Logically, it seems to me that practice and understanding
should confirm structure, and not the other way around.
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the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia addressed whether earlier Con-
gresses had required the assistance of state officials.23 Justice Scalia
not only made his historical case but also directly engaged the dissents
of Justice Stevens and Justice Souter in extensive footnotes.2 4
In Section 11LA, Justice Scalia turned to the structure of the Con-
stitution for guidance on whether Congress can command state law
enforcement officials to enforce federal law. The Framers, the Court
wrote, "explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the
power to regulate individuals, not States."25 As a consequence, citi-
zens are subject to
"two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected
from incursion by the other'-a legal system . . . establishing two
orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own
privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people
who sustain it and are governed by it.2 6
The Court concluded that this design constituted "structural protec-
tions of liberty"27 and that the "power of the Federal Government
would be augmented immeasurably if it were able to impress into its
service-and at no cost to itself-the police officers of the 50 States." 28
Section II.B presents the critical separation of powers discussion.
Remarkably, the entire section consists of one paragraph and a single
footnote. The section, including the footnote and all citations, fol-
lows in its entirety:
We have thus far discussed the effect that federal control of state
officers would have upon the first element of the "double security"
alluded to by Madison: the division of power between State and Fed-
I have argued that in the First Amendment arena, Justice Scalia has not brought
to the First Amendment the kind of careful parsing of text and structure that he has
imposed on separation of powers and federalism cases. See Jay S. Bybee, Common
Ground: Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the First Amendment, 75 TUL.
L. REV. 251, 293 (2000). In First Amendment cases, Justice Scalia has announced that
he will draw his principles from the "long accepted practices of the American people"
and not from a "a text as indeterminate as the First Amendment." 44 Liquormart,
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). Perhaps Printz evidences thatJustice Scalia will extend his
historical methodology to any constitutional question that he cannot answer from the
text.
23 521 U.S. at 904-09.
24 See id.
25 Id. at 920 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)).
26 Id. (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
27 Id. at 921.
28 Id. at 922.
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eral Governments. It would also have an effect upon the second
element: the separation and equilibration of powers between the
three branches of the Federal Government itself. The Constitution
does not leave to speculation who is to administer the laws enacted
by Congress; the President, it says, "shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3, personally and through officers
whom he appoints (save for such inferior officers as Congress may
authorize to be appointed by the "Courts of Law" or by "the Heads
of Departments" who are themselves presidential appointees), Art.
II, § 2. The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to
thousand of CLEOs in the 50 States, who are left to implement the
program without meaningful Presidential control (if indeed mean-
ingful Presidential control is possible without the power to appoint
and remove). The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the Fed-
eral Executive-to ensure both vigor and accountability-is well
known. See The Federalist No. 70 (A. Hamilton); 2 Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution 495 (M. Jensen ed.
1976) (statement of James Wilson); see also Calabresi & Prakash,
The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 104 Yale L. J. 541
(1994). That unity would be shattered, and the power of the Presi-
dent would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effec-
tively without the President as with him, by simply requiring state
officers to execute its laws.
(FN12) There is not, as the dissent believes, post, at 960, "tension"
between the proposition that impressing state police officers into
federal service will massively augment federal power, and the pro-
position that it will also sap the power of the Federal Presidency. It is
quite possible to have a more powerful Federal Government that is,
by reason of the destruction of its Executive unity, a less efficient
one. The dissent is correct, post, at 959-960, that control by the
unitary Federal Executive is also sacrificed when States voluntarily
administer federal programs, but the condition of voluntary state
participation significantly reduces the ability of Congress to use this
device as a means of reducing the power of the Presidency.29
In Section III.C, the Court argued that the Necessary and Proper
Clause did not support federal conscription of state officials, 30 and in
Section IV, the Court reviewed the jurisprudence concerning the use
of state officials. 31 In Section V, the Court cleaned up some adminis-
trative details concerning the CLEOs. 3 2 Except for Section III.B, every
other section of the opinion treated the federalism question raised by
the CLEO petitioners: Can Congress forcibly enlist state officials to
29 1& at 922-23 & n.12 (emphasis in original).
30 See id. at 923-25.
31 See id. at 925-33.
32 See id. at 933-35.
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enforce federal law? The remainder of the opinion directly supports
the Court's structural arguments in Section III.A, and no other sec-
tion addresses historical practices, cases, or other matters that would
sustain the Court's opinion in Section III.B. Section III.B apparently
stands or falls on its own.
None of the other opinions squarely took on Section III.B. Jus-
tice Stevens, who wrote the principal dissent, noted the Court's "color-
ful hyperbole," but returned immediately to the federalism point,
suggesting (rather unhelpfully) only that the Court's separation of
powers point "contradicts New York v. United States."'33 And in a foot-
note, Justice Stevens asserted that the "use of state officials on an in-
terim basis [did] not raise even arguable separation-of-powers
concerns,"'3 4 yet failed to elaborate. Elsewhere injustice Stevens's dis-
sent, he employed the language of the separation of powers cases,
5
but he still missed justice Scalia's point entirely. And if the other con-
curring or dissenting justices noticed Justice Scalia's separation of
powers emendation, they neglected to mention it.36
II. WHAT, PRECISELY, DID JUSTICE SCALA Do?
Let us take a closer look at Section III.B. At the end of Section
Ill.A, the Court quoted James Madison in Federalist No. 51, who wrote
that the "compound republic of America" supplied a "double security"
for the right of the people.3 7 "IT]he power surrendered by the peo-
ple is first divided between two distinct governments and then the por-
tion allotted to each subdivision among distinct and separate
departments."38 Madison neatly described a vertical division of power
between states and the federal government, and a horizontal separa-
tion of federal power among the three great departments. This pro-
vided a smooth segue from Justice Scalia's previous discussion of
federalism to the second part of the "double security," separation of
33 Id. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
34 Id. at 960 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
35 See id. at 951 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to his own approach to the
historical record as a "functional approach"); id. at 959 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (refer-
ring to the "incentives for the National Government to aggrandize itself).
36 Justice O'Connor andJustice Thomas each concurred separately to emphasize
the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 935 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 936
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Souter dissented to argue that The Federalist sup-
ported federal conscription of the states. See id. at 970-76 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Breyer, also dissenting, discussed other nations' experiences with federalism.
See id. at 976-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
37 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
38 Id.; see also Print, 521 U.S. at 922 (quoting Tim FEDERALIST, supra note 37).
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powers. At initial glance, Section III.B arguably stands on a coequal
basis with Section III.A. But Section III.B is less fully developed and
never acquires the stature of Section III.A.
First, in the single paragraph that comprises the section, the
Court does not refer to any case.39 Moreover, the Court cites none of
the standard separation of powers opinions anywhere else in the opin-
ion.40 Furthermore, the sources thatJustice Scalia actually invokes are
an unusual lot. Apart from references to Sections 2 and 3 of Article II,
the Court only relied on three sources: Federalist No. 70, a statement by
James Wilson at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, and a law re-
view article. The Court has rarely cited Federalist No. 70. In fact, only
two Justices on the modem Court have invoked it: Justice Scalia in his
dissent in Morrison,41 and Justice Breyer in his concurrence in Clinton
v. Jones,42 when he cited both Federalist No. 70 and Justice Scalia's dis-
sent in Morrison. In Printz, Justice Scalia also cited James Wilson's
comments at the Pennsylvania ratification convention. Although Jus-
tice Scalia did not quote Wilson, Justice Scalia's declaration that "the
Framers [insisted] upon unity in the Federal Executive... to ensure
both vigor and accountability"43 echoes Wilson's statement that "the
executive authority is ond' and outside this principle there is "neither
vigor, decision, nor responsibility."44 Finally, Justice Scalia cited an
39 See text accompanying note 29.
40 The Court previously referred to Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935), but only for a point indirectly related to its later separation of powers
discussion. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 908 n.2.
41 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 729 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia quotes The Federalist No. 70 to emphasize the unity in the executive and the
accountability that this requires:
[The Founders] provided that all executive powers would be exercised by a
single Chief Executive. As Hamilton put it, "[t] he ingredients which consti-
tute safety in the republican sense are a due dependence on the people, and
a due responsibility." The President is directly dependent on the people,
and since there is only one President, he is responsible. The people know
whom to blame, whereas "one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in
the executive... is that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility."
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
42 520 U.S. 681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
43 Printz, 521 U.S. at 922.
44 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONTITUTION 495
(Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (statement of James Wilson) (emphasis in original). Wil-
son commented:
[T] he executive authority is one; by this means we obtain very important advan-
tages. We may discover from history, from reasoning, and from experience,
the security which this furnishes. The executive power is better to be trusted
when it has no screen. Sir, we have a responsibility in the person of our Presi-
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extensive and important article in the Yale Law Journal by Professors
Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, but he referred to no spe-
cific pages.45 Thus, in the entire section, Justice Scalia offered two
citations to the Constitution, no cases, and three very general citations
to outside sources. Scalia's opinion, at least visually, implied that Sec-
tion III.B's proposition is so clear that mere citation to the Constitu-
tion suffices, and the idea is so plain that no Justice has labored to
repeat it in an opinion; the proposition may, nevertheless, be usefully
supported by general reference to original and academic materials.
Second, even the Court's rhetoric has its source injustice Scalia's
dissent in Morrison. The Court in Printz referred to the "second ele-
ment" of the "double security" provided by the Constitution as the
"separation and equilibration of powers between the three
branches."46 Of course, the phrase "separation of powers" is a com-
mon and familiar term, but whence "equilibration of powers?" As
strange as the phrase sounds, the phrase "separation and equilibra-
tion of powers" has appeared before in the United States Reports-three
times, to be exact. It appeared twice injustice Scalia's dissent in Mor-
rison47 and again injustice Scalia's majority opinion in Steel Co. v. Citi-
zens for a Better Environment.48 Similarly, Justice Scalia's references to
"unity in the Federal Executive" and the "unitary Federal Executive"
are not only vintage Scalia, but straight out of Morrison.49
dent; he cannot act improperly, and hide either his negligence, or inatten-
tion; he cannot roll upon any other person the weight of his criminality....
We secure vigor, we well know what numerous executives are. We know
there is neither vigor, decision, nor responsibility in them. Id. (emphasis in
original).
45 Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE LJ. 541 (1994). The article, which is 124 pages long, responds to
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1994).
46 Printz 521 U.S at 922.
47 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 704 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to "the fountain-
head of [our appointment and removal jurisprudence], the separation and equilibra-
tion of powers"); id. at 727 ("The purpose of the separation and equilibration of
powers in general, and of the unitary Executive in particular, was not merely to assure
effective government but to preserve individual freedom."); see also Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 30 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to "sepa-
rated and equilibrated powers").
48 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998) (referring to the "constitutional elements of jurisdic-
tion" as "an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers").
49 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727, 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to the "unitary
Executive"); see also United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 449 (1988) (same). So far
as I can determine, these are the first references to the "unitary executive" in the
United States Reports. The first reference in federal cases to the "unitary executive" is
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Third, aside from the citations and the rhetoric, Justice Scalia's
theory of separation of powers in Printz reiterates the theory that he
developed in his dissent in Morrison. In that case, the Court upheld
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 197850 that created the
Office of the Independent Counsel.51 The Court held that the Act
did not violate separation of powers principles when it provided that a
special panel of the D.C. Circuit appoint the independent counsel 52
and that the Attorney General could remove the independent counsel
only for "good cause."55 The majority found that the court's appoint-
ment comported with the Appointments Clause because the indepen-
dent counsel was an inferior officer of the United States.54 The Court
further held that neither the removal provision nor the "reduc[tion
in] the President's ability to control the prosecutorial powers wielded
by the independent counsel" violated the separation of powers.55
ForJustice Scalia, the lone dissenter in Morrison, the independent
counsel provision "effect[ed] important change in the equilibrium of
power,"56just as the Brady Act effected change in the "equilibration of
powers. '57 His theory in Morrison and Printz rests on the following
premises: (1) The Constitution commits to the President alone the
executive power of the United States. As Justice Scalia stated in Printz,
"[t] he Constitution does not leave to speculation who is to administer
the laws enacted by Congress,"'58 and in Morrison, "[the Constitution]
does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive
In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 482 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988). The phrase also appeared in Opinion of the Justices to the House of
Representatives, 425 N.E.2d 750, 752 (Mass. 1981).
50 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The Act expiredJune 30, 1999.
See id. § 599.
51 Morison, 487 U.S. at 659-60 (holding that the "provisions of the Act do not
violate the Appointments Clause of the Constitution, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, or the limita-
tions of Article III, nor do they impermissibly interfere with the President's authority
under Article II in violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers").
52 See id. at 678 (stating that "once it is accepted that the Appointments Clause
gives Congress the power to vest the appointment of officials such as the independent
counsel in the 'courts of Law,' there can be no Article III objection to the Special
Division's exercise of that power" described in 28 U.S.C. § 593).
53 See id. at 693 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (1) does not "interfere impermis-
sibly with [the President's] Constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution
of the laws").
54 Id. at 677.
55 Id. at 685, 693, 696.
56 Id. at 699 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997).
58 Id.
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power. ' 59 (2) The executive authority extends to the enforcement of
federal laws, including conducting criminal prosecution (as in Morri-
son) 60 and supervising federal gun restrictions (as in Printz). (3) Ac-
cordingly, Congress may assign the execution of the laws only to
officials subordinate to the President.6' As Scalia argued in Morrison,
"the President's constitutionally assigned duties include complete con-
trol over investigation and prosecution of violations of the law,"' 62 so
the law cannot vest executive authority in an official whom the Presi-
dent can neither appoint nor remove. Thus, "the independent coun-
sel is not an inferior officer because she is not subordinate to any
officer in the Executive Branch (indeed, not even to the President)."63
Similarly, in Printz, "[t] he Brady Act effectively transfer [red] [respon-
sibility for enforcement] to thousands of CLEOs ... who are left to
implement the program without meaningful Presidential control (if
indeed meaningful Presidential control is possible without the power
to appoint and remove). "64
In general, the Court has vigorously enforced the separation of
powers when a statute or action grants one branch a power constitu-
tionally committed to a coordinate branch of government-that is,
when the branch "aggrandized" itself at the expense of a coordinate
branch.65 The Court, however, has not enforced the separation of
powers as enthusiastically when one branch has "undermined, without
appreciable expansion of its own power, the role of [another
59 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
60 Professor Krent has questioned the historical accuracy of this premise. See gen-
eraly Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from
History, 38 Am. U. L. REV. 275 (1989);.see also HaroldJ. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary
Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Govern-
ment, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62, 72-74 (1990) [hereinafter Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary
Executive]; Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957,
1990-91 (1993).
61 See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HAuv. L. REV.
1231, 1242 (1994) ("[if a statue vests discretionary authority directly in an agency
official (as do most regulatory statutes) rather than in the President, the Article II
Vesting Clause seems to require that such discretionary authority be subject to the
President's control.").
62 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 710 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64 Print; 521 U.S. at 922.
65 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 956-59 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-40 (1976).
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branch]."66 The Court has not policed "encroachment" on the pow-
ers of a branch in the absence of "aggrandizement. '67
In the encroachment cases, the Court has asked whether the re-
duction in power to the one branch (without an increase in power to
another branch) "impermissibly undermined"68 the branch or "pre-
vent[ed] the ... Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally as-
signed functions. ' 69 In Morrison, Justice Scalia argued vigorously that
the mere fact of reduction of a vested power violated the Constitution.
It was "ultimately irrelevant how much the statute reduces Presidential
control"70 since "all purely executive power had to be in the Presi-
dent. ' 71 And in Printz, he explained that "if Congress could act as
effectively without the President as with him" then "[t] hat unity would
be shattered, and the power of the President would be subject to re-
duction. '72 Thus, for Justice Scalia, Congress cannot reduce the
power of the President by conferring the power on some other entity,
even if Congress has neither assumed that power for itself nor con-
ferred it upon the federal judiciary. Under Scalia's theory, the inde-
pendent counsel statute and the Brady Act violated separation of
powers because they lodged executive authority in an entity-an inde-
pendent prosecutor and state law enforcement official-not subject to
the President. It was also irrelevant for Justice Scalia's purposes that
the Brady Act had vested enforcement in public officials, albeit state
officials. The Brady Act would have been equally infirm had it
charged a private entity-say, IBM or the Rand Corporation-with en-
forcing the interim background check.
66 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856-57 (1986);
see also Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 444-45 (1977).
67 SeeJay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51, 107 & n.276 (1994); see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't
of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 484-85 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(arguing that the Court employs a balancing test when dealing with powers "within
the general grant to the President of the 'executive Power,'" but has "refused to toler-
ate any intrusion" on powers explicitly committed to the President).
68 Schor, 478 U.S. at 856.
69 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 684, 695 (1988)
(quoting the same passage from Nixon).
70 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
71 Id. at 715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997).
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III. WHAT DOES PRiNTz MEAN FOR FUTURE SEPARATION OF
POWERS CASES?
Justice Scalia's departure from the Court's prior separation of
powers analysis is most notable for its brazenness, not for its novelty.
The Justice boldly asserted his own well-known views on separation of
powers as though they enjoyed a lineage as obvious as his arguments
regarding federalism. But what happens next? How significant is Sec-
tion III.B? Is it merely dicta, as some commentators and judges have
suggested?73 Or is it an alternative holding, entitled to some regard
but less than a considered opinion, because the remainder of the jus-
tices did not consciously embrace it?74 Or perhaps Section III.B rep-
resents what Justice Scalia said it was, an alternative holding,
considered and consciously adopted by a majority of the Court?75
Section III.B may be more than dicta, and it might well signal
some movement by a majority of the Court in Justice Scalia's direc-
tion. Since the time Justice Scalia wrote his dissent in Morrison, several
scholars have assessed the question of congressional power to assign
law enforcement functions outside of the executive branch.76 Other
scholars have addressed the narrower issue of Congress' power to as-
sign enforcement responsibility to the states. 77 The question that the
Court answered in Printz has had better venting in the academic litera-
ture than in case law. It would be easier to dismiss Justice Scalia's
articulation if he was merely repeating what he wrote in Morrison and
was doing so shortly after Morrison was issued. Given the additional
academic attention devoted to the question, Printz may deserve more
credence.
Justice Scalia may have felt emboldened by the criticism of Inde-
pendent Counsels Lawrence Walsh and Kenneth Starr, and the Ethics
73 Professor Kinkopf, emphatically and repeatedly, called Scalia's separation of
powers discussion "dictum." Kinkopf, supra note 12, at 375-83; see also Riley v. St.
Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514, 525 (5th Cir. 1999) (referring to the separation
of powers discussion in Printz as "dicta"), revd en banc, 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001);
id. at 551 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (describing the Printz Court as "rest[ing] its deci-
sion not on separation of power doctrine but upon notions of federalism").
74 Professor Caminker suggested that this section was "an attempted end-run
around the Court's rejection of [Scalia's] ... position in [Morrison]" and "wonder[ed]
about Printz's precedential value on this point." Caminker, supra note 12, at 226.
75 See City of NewYork v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing
Printz as resting on federalism and separation of powers concerns).
76 See, e.g., Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive, supra note 60.
77 See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Com-
mandeer State Officers To Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995); Evan
Caminker, The Unitary Executive and State Administration of Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1075 (1997); Prakash, supra note 60.
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in Government Act. 78 Perhaps Justice Scalia anticipated correctly the
vindication of his Morrison dissent in the recent demise of the inde-
pendent counsel provisions of the Act. The academy came late to Jus-
tice Scalia's defense, 79 but it did defend his Morrison dissent (at least
on policy grounds)80 when it became obvious that "nearly every float
in the parade of horribles predicted by Justice Scalia ha[d] come to
pass."81 There are other, more substantive reasons to take Section
III.B seriously. The fact that the Court revisited the propriety of Con-
gress assigning federal law enforcement outside of the executive
branch in a case involving federalism demonstrates the profundity of
the principle. Congress has enacted a number of creative enforce-
ment schemes involving states and private citizens. For example, Con-
gress may encourage state enforcement of federal guidelines through
its spending and taxing authority, or it may encourage state coopera-
tion by giving the states the option of enforcing federal guidelines or
facing federal preemption of state law followed by federal
enforcement.8 2
Given the Court's current view of cooperative federalism, objec-
tions to enforcement of federal law by parties outside the executive
78 See David A. Sklansky, Starr, Singleton, and the Prosecutor's Role, 26 FoRDHAM
URB. L.J. 509, 510 (1999) ("Justice Scalia could be excused for feeling a little smug.").
79 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Nixon 's Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1405, 1414-15
(1999) (stating that Scalia's opinion in Morrison was "brilliant and prescient"); Susan
Low Bloch, Cleaning Up the Legal Debris Left in the Wake of Whitewater, 43 ST. Louis U.
LJ. 779, 782 (1999) ("I now believe that Justice Scalia was right in Morrison v. Olson
when he warned us of the dangers of the independent counsel statute."); Robert F.
Drinan, Reflections on Lawyers, Legal Ethics and the Clinton Impeachment, 68 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 559, 561 (1999) ("I sometimes wish that the United States Supreme Court had
agreed with Justice Scalia's sole dissent in Morrison v. Olson."); see also Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L.
REv. 1337, 1394 (1999) ("A curious byproduct of Ken Starr's investigation of Presi-
dent Clinton's misconduct has been virtual unanimity that the Independent Counsel
arrangement is, if not flatly unconstitutional, deeply problematic and should be
scrapped.").
80 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEo. L.J. 2267,
2268 n.3 (1998) ("Many ofJustice Scalia's objections do point to serious problems in
the Act... stress[ing] those problems as a policy matter."); Cass R. Sunstein, Lessons
from a Debacle: From Impeachment to Reform, 51 FLA. L. REV. 599, 610 (1999) ("Justice
Scalia is not a gloater, but he must have been something like the most gratified man
in Washington to hear people who do not normally like Justice Scalia quoting him
and admiring him for his prescience. And his dissenting opinion in Morrison was
really on the money .... ").
81 Nick Bravin, Note, Is Morrison v. Olson Still Good Law? The Court's New Appoint-
ments ClauseJurisprudence, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1106 (1998) (citation omitted).
82 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992); Hodel v. Va. Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288-89 (1981).
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branch should be least persuasive in cases of state (as opposed to pri-
vate) enforcement. Because the Constitution does not demand any
particular form of separation of powers within a state,8 3 all of the
states have some variation of the theme of separation of powers that
should ensure greater "vigor and accountability" in state enforcement
of federal law than we would find in private or foreign enforcement of
federal law. Furthermore, state officials are generally subject to the
same kind of checks and balances as federal officials, and their juris-
diction under the Brady Act extended no further than their jurisdic-
tion under state law.8 4 State governments are, after all, governments
established and maintained under the United States and state
constitutions.
Thus, apart from regimes that commandeer the states, the Court
should be most reluctant to find separation of powers objections in a
creative scheme involving the states. In other words, the facts in Printz
supply the strongest case for Court approval of enforcement outside
the executive branch enforcement by state governments-and the
Court rejected it. A scheme involving enforcement of federal laws by
non-governmental, quasi-governmental, or foreign governmental enti-
ties lacks the same assurances of checks and balances and limited ju-
risdiction that exists with public officers. Such a scheme supplies the
weakest case for surviving a separation of powers challenge. Printz
does not bode well for more creative schemes involving non-govern-
mental enforcement, such as qui tam actions.8 5
This last point invites the next question: Does the Court's separa-
tion of powers analysis ever stand independent of its commandeering
principle? Justice Stevens argued that the majority's principle could
not stand because Congress also reduces the executive's enforcement
responsibility when it encourages voluntary state enforcement
schemes, and the Court has approved of those arrangements. 86 The
majority acknowledged the point, but answered that separation of
powers objections do not arise when the states "voluntarily administer
federal programs."87 Here the strength of the Court's federalism
principle manifests itself in its separation of powers analysis: the exec-
83 See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52 (1975).
84 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (1994) (stating that a state's chief law enforcement of-
ficer must take reasonable steps to determine if buyer's receipt of handgun would
violate federal, state, or local law).
85 See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994); see also infra text
accompanying notes 94-99.
86 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 960-61 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
87 Id. at 923 n.12.
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utive would not object to the states voluntarily enforcing federal law
because, as Justice Scalia explained, "voluntary state participation sig-
nificantly reduces the ability of Congress to use this device as a means
of reducing the power of the Presidency."88 In other words, when
states voluntarily enforce federal law, the executive (indeed, the fed-
eral government as a whole) is relieved of responsibility, but the same
could be said of any state-initiated enforcement that persuades Con-
gress that federal action is not needed. So long as the states enforce
the state law or federal guidelines voluntarily, the executive remains
unitary; Congress has not charged the states with taking care that fed-
eral law is faithfully executed.
There is another way of characterizing what the Court said. The
federal government and the states are dual sovereigns. In accordance
with their respective constitutions, the people have conferred govern-
mental powers on the states and on the federal government. Some of
the powers are concurrent, some are exclusive, and some powers that
governments might be tempted to exercise are denied to either gov-
ernment. The exercise of coercive force is an essential government
function; in our federalist system, that means it is a function of either
the state or the federal government (or both). When Congress acts
within its exclusive powers, the states may not act. In cases where the
Constitution has committed the power exclusively to the federal gov-
ernment, even congressional inaction cannot justify state action.8 9 By
contrast, when Congress acts in an area in which it shares authority
with the states, congressional regulation coexists with state regulation
unless the state regulation actually conflicts with federal regulation,
congressional regulation expressly preempts state regulation, or con-
gressional regulation impliedly preempts state regulation (by occupy-
ing the field of legislation).90 When Congress permits state regulation
in accordance with federal guidelines, Congress has merely invited
state participation in an area which Congress might regulate directly
and preempt all state regulation. Voluntary state participation in fed-
eral programs permits the state to retain some power to administer
the program under state policies (consistent with federal guidelines)
rather than suffer complete preemption. Such arrangements allow
the states to regulate areas for which the federal government might
otherwise assume responsibility. Although the arrangement enables
Congress to avoid establishing a costly federal bureaucracy, state en-
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
90 See, e.g., Grade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992); Penn-
sylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 502-05 (1956).
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forcement remains voluntary; the states may withdraw at any time and
for any reason, understanding that the consequence of their with-
drawal may be direct federal regulation. Congress has great incentive
to consider state policies and interests in the federal guidelines, lest
the states withdraw from the program and force Congress to regulate
the matter directly; the threat that states will refuse to participate gives
the states some check on Congress. The whole arrangement is truly
cooperative and does not erode the President's power.
In essence, in this cooperative arrangement, the states have made
the federal guidelines their own and enforced the latter. If the states
refuse to follow federal guidelines, Congress has few options. Con-
gress may authorize federal enforcement, but it cannot conscript the
states in the effort. Rather, it must assign the task to the President.
Thus, as Justice Scalia explained, when Congress encourages state de-
cisions to enforce federal guidelines, Congress has limited power to
reduce presidential powers because the scheme depends on the vol-
untary cooperation of the states. State enforcement of federal guide-
lines reduces the opportunity for presidential enforcement, but it
does not reduce any federal power that the executive would logically
possess. When the Court stated that the Brady Act reduced the Presi-
dent's power,91 it was because Congress simply required the states,
without their consent, to operate the federal program. It was not be-
cause Congress had entered into an arrangement of cooperative fed-
eralism in which the states might voluntarily bear the costs of
administration, knowing that if they declined, Congress might be
forced to regulate the matter directly. The Brady Act violated the
states' sovereignty, by regulating the states as states, 92 and it reduced
the President's prerogatives as the chief enforcer of federal laws.
There is a sense in which the Court's point about separation of
powers may lack any significance independent of the Court's broader
argument over the commandeering of the state. The separation of
powers objection to this state-federal arrangement could only arise in
a case in which there was also a federalism objection. This may help
explain why the dissent glossed over the separation of powers point
without realizing the broader implications of the theory; it may also
explain the acquiescence of at least two members of the majority
(Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor) who previously de-
91 See Print; 521 U.S. at 922-23.
92 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000) (holding that Congress may
regulate states to the extent states participate in interstate markets); see also Jay S.
Bybee, The Tenth Amendment Among the Shadows: On Reading the Constitution in Plato's
Cave, 23 HAtv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 551, 560 & n.48 (2000) (discussing Printz and
Condon).
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clined to join Justice Scalia.93 It does not explain why the remainder
of the Court failed to understand, or at least acknowledge, the impli-
cations ofJustice Scalia's analysis to other entities not subject to presi-
dential control.
The broadest implications of the separation of powers argument
in Printz are for those creative arrangements in which Congress has
committed the enforcement of federal law to non-governmental (or at
least non-federal and non-state) entities.94 Printz presented a strategic
context in which Justice Scalia might press his views of separation of
powers; the principle was inextricably intertwined with the federalism
point, making it easy for those who joined him on the broader federal-
ism analysis to join him in Section III.B as well. Moreover, the point
was made in the most compelling context, an arrangement in which
upon separation of powers grounds there would be the least objection
to a cooperative enforcement arrangement that involved diminishing
the President's powers in favor of state and local law enforcement offi-
cials. The implications, however, for such assignments outside of the
federal-state context may be enormous. A fortiori, Printz threatens
schemes involving enforcement of federal law by non-state entities. I
previously mentioned qui tam statutes as a prime candidate for this
Printz analysis. In Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States,
the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Scalia, upheld the stand-
ing of qui tam relators.95 The Court noted, however, that it "ex-
press[ed] no view whether qui tam suits violated Article II, in
particular the Appointments Clause of Section 2 and the "Take Care"
Clause of Section 3."96 The Court might easily have added a citation
to Section III.B. More recently, the Fifth Circuit has engaged Section
III.B. In Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, the court considered a
constitutional challenge to a federal qui tam provision. A divided
panel of the Fifth Circuit struck down the provision, and arguments
over Section III.B figured in the majority and dissenting opinions.97
93 Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Scalia re-
main from the Court that decided Morison. Justice Kennedy did not participate in
the case.
94 See Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive, supra note 60, at 84-93 (discussing
examples).
95 529 U.S. 765, 787 (2000).
96 Id. at 778 n.8.
97 196 F.3d 514, 524-25 (quoting most of Section III.B, and later referring to it as
"dicta"), vacated, 196 F.3d 561, rev'd en banc, 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001); id. at
551-52 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (referring to Section III.B, and arguing that Printz
"rested its decision not on separation of powers doctrine but upon notions of federal-
ism incorporated in the Constitution"); see also Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural
Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens and the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100
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After the Fifth Circuit vacated the panel's opinion and reheard the
case en banc, the court upheld the provision. 98 The dissenting judges
again cited Section 1.B as evidence that the qui tam provision vio-
lated the Take Care Clause.99 It is not likely that we have heard the
last on the qui tam issue.
Finally, the majority's opinion (including its asides on the relative
importance of the appointment and removal power) calls into ques-
tion Humphrey's Executor v. United States,100 threatening the continued
independence of the fourth branch of government, the independent
regulatory agencies. 101 For those who advocate a constitutional theory
of the unitary executive, the demise of Humphrey's Executor would be
the real prize. The Court in Humphrey's Executor held that Congress
could restrain the President's removal of commissioners of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission; the decision appears to conflict with Chief
Justice Taft's lengthy and scholarly opinion in Myers v. United States.102
Justice Scalia has repeatedly attacked Humphrey's Executor or otherwise
attempted to diminish its impact. For example, in his Morrison dis-
sent, Justice Scalia announced that the majority opinion "swept
[Humphrey's Executor] into the dustbin of repudiated constitutional
principles," because the Court was even less precise about the Presi-
dent's removal authority in Morrison than it had been in Humphrey's
Executor.'03 In Mistretta v. United States, Justice Scalia (again in lone
COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1437-39 (2000) (discussing Riley). But see United States ex rel.
Wright v. Cleo Wallace Ctrs., 132 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920 (D. Colo. 2000) (declining to
follow panel opinion in Riey); United States ex rel. Fender v. Tenet Healthcare Corp.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1232-33 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (same).
98 252 F.3d 749, 758 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
99 Id. at 760 (Smith, J., dissenting).
100 295 U.S. 602 (1935); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Struc-
tural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 H-uv. L. REV. 1155, 1170
(1992) ("The non-unitarian position derives support from two major Supreme Court
decisions: Humphrey's Executor v. United States and Morrison v. Olson.").
101 See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. Ru 573 (1984).
102 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
103 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 725 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia added:
One can hardly grieve for the shoddy treatment given today to Humphrey's
Executor, which, after all, accorded the same indignity (with much less justifi-
cation) to Chief Justice Taft's opinion 10 years earlier in Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)-gutting, in six quick pages devoid of textual or
historical precedent for the novel principle it set forth, a carefully
researched and reasoned 70-page opinion. It is in fact comforting to witness
the reality that he who lives by the ipse dixit dies by the ipse dixit.
Id. at 725-26.
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dissent) warned that Mistretta might "aptly be described as the
Humphrey's Executor of the Judicial Branch, and I think we will live to
regret it."104 He wrote in Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue that
"adjusting... the Constitution to compensate for Humphrey's Executor
is a fruitless endeavor. ' 105 Thus far, Justice Scalia's warnings have
gone unheeded. 10 6 Humphrey's Executor has shown resilience and
vitality. 10 7
We do not have to read very far between the lines to understand
that Humphres Executor remains a substantial impediment to Justice
Scalia's theory of executive power. To the extent that he has turned
the Court in Printz, he has made Printz an embarrassment to
Humphrey's Executor, and by extension, to Morrison and Mistretta.
CONCLUSION
We have not seen the last of Section III.B ofJustice Scalia's opin-
ion in Printz. Justice Scalia's theory of the unitary executive is a coher-
ent, powerful theory, although it is a theory that the modern Court
has largely resisted. It is surely ironic that in a case as important and
as contentious as Printz, the Justices apparently overlooked Justice
Scalia's theory. Justice Scalia will be back with Printz. Meanwhile, the
next time the fire alarm goes off, everyone check your pockets.
104 488 U.S. 361, 425 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 501 U.S. 868, 921 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
106 See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil 57 U. GIN. L. REv. 849, 851
(1989) (arguing that Humphrey's Executor "essentially overruled" Myers); Antonin
Scalia, Historical Anomalies in Administrative Law, 1985 YEARBOOK (SUPREME COURT
His-romcAL SocnT) 103, 106-10.
[C]uriously enough, Humphrey's Executor's six-page constitutional pro-
nouncement on a matter of central importance to the structure of govern-
ment-six pages concededly contrary to the much more extensive analysis in
the pre-New Deal case of Myers nine years earlier-seems to have grown
rather than diminished in its stature, or at least in its consequences.
Id. at 110; see also Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1396-1402 (D.D.C.)
(three-judge court per curiam), affd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
It is generally assumed that then-Circuit Judge Scalia wrote the three-judge panel's
decision.
107 See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 487 (1989) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 724-26 (1986) (relying on
Humphrey's Executor and concluding that Congress cannot have the power to remove
executive officials except by impeachment); Wigginton v. Centracchio, 205 F.3d 504,
514 n.13 (1st Cir. 2000); Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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